Tuesday December 19, 2006
Mounting Troubles in Afghanistan Signal Further Dangers
The news from Pakistan's border regions is getting worse, not better, and it seems unlikely that the new wave of attacks and recruitment are the result of Taliban desperation or lack of power, as the administration likes to say.
The recent call by Zawahiri to residents of Kabul to rise up against the Americans is not so interesting for the text of the message, but because it shows an ability to comment on recent events, and project a message in an area and at a time when such projections have a strong psychological impact.
Far from weakening, the Taliban and its remaining al Qaeda allies, operating often with the continued assistance of the Pakistani military and intelligence, are gaining strength. For the past year I and others have been forwarding the observations of those on the ground on how the Taliban has re-armed with new weapons, increased its communications capabilities-including encryption-and greatly enhanced its mobility by purchasing a new fleet of 4X4 vehicles. The Washington Post carried an intersting article on this again yesterday.
It is the classic dilema in combatting non-state armed groups that enjoy either civilian support or are able to intimidate civilians into cooperation. The central government is weak, drug money provides endless resources to warlords who are able to keep the central government at bay, and radical Islamists thrive in the chaos.
Without intelligence dominance, despite the presence of tens of thousands of Pakistani troops in the region, U.S. and NATO forces will be limited to fighting the hot war there, able to push back against significant armed actions. But they will not be able to decapitate the movement or keep it from growing. The central government, riddled with corruption, badly infiltrated by the enemy and with a fraction of the enemy's resources, is unlikely to be expanding its influence in the near future.
That leaves the U.S. and NATO troops in the uneviable position of trying to keep a bush fire from turning into a roaring forest fire, but unable to identify the pyromaniacs.
The recent call by Zawahiri to residents of Kabul to rise up against the Americans is not so interesting for the text of the message, but because it shows an ability to comment on recent events, and project a message in an area and at a time when such projections have a strong psychological impact.
Far from weakening, the Taliban and its remaining al Qaeda allies, operating often with the continued assistance of the Pakistani military and intelligence, are gaining strength. For the past year I and others have been forwarding the observations of those on the ground on how the Taliban has re-armed with new weapons, increased its communications capabilities-including encryption-and greatly enhanced its mobility by purchasing a new fleet of 4X4 vehicles. The Washington Post carried an intersting article on this again yesterday.
It is the classic dilema in combatting non-state armed groups that enjoy either civilian support or are able to intimidate civilians into cooperation. The central government is weak, drug money provides endless resources to warlords who are able to keep the central government at bay, and radical Islamists thrive in the chaos.
Without intelligence dominance, despite the presence of tens of thousands of Pakistani troops in the region, U.S. and NATO forces will be limited to fighting the hot war there, able to push back against significant armed actions. But they will not be able to decapitate the movement or keep it from growing. The central government, riddled with corruption, badly infiltrated by the enemy and with a fraction of the enemy's resources, is unlikely to be expanding its influence in the near future.
That leaves the U.S. and NATO troops in the uneviable position of trying to keep a bush fire from turning into a roaring forest fire, but unable to identify the pyromaniacs.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Tuesday December 19, 2006
Taylor Finally at the Hague
Charles Taylor, former president of Liberia accused of systematic and massive crimes against humanity, has arrived in the Hague to stand trial for his atrocities. He will likely be staying at the Milosevic suite, but perhaps will stay alive through the trial.
The trip from Freetown, Sierra Leone, where the charges against him were lodged by the U.N.-back Special Court for Sierra Leone, marks the end of one phase of the saga that saw Taylor flee Liberia, receive asylum in Nigeria, attempt an escape and then be held under shaky security in Sierra Leone.
The Special Court will still conduct the trial, not the ICC, and that will be the next phase of Taylor's tumble from power. The ICC is simply lending its secure facilities to hold Taylor who, after all, escaped from a U.S. prison in Massachusetts before starting his murderous exploits in Africa that plunged an entire region into chaos.
A friend of Hezbollah, al Qaeda, Viktor Bout and other terrorist and criminal organizations, Taylor presided over wars and conflicts that devastated an entire region, and cost hundreds of thousands of lives. He enjoyed the friendship and complicity of Gadaffi in Libya, Compaore in Burkina Faso and several other heads of state. He befriended Pat Robertson, Jesse Jackson and others across the Christian spectrum with his ability to appear to be a simple Baptist minister.
Many in the human rights community wanted the trial to remain in Freetown to show that African countries can judge their own.
It is a nice idea. But given Taylor's signficant offshore financial empire and other holdings, and his demonstrated ability to recruit armed thugs and create chaos made the risk too high.
The corruptability of the guards, Taylor's ability to threaten the families of guards, witnesses and lawyer from prison and the proximity of loyal armed groups and complicit heads of state all made the chances of his facing justice from a Freetown prison to low to bet on.
Taylor's transfer to ICC facilities became possible when the British late last week agreed to hold him if he is convicted. The issue of where he would spend his prison time had bogged things down for several weeks, as the Dutch did not want that responsibility. When the British stepped forward, the final roadblock was removed.
Taylor's trial will be the most important of a generation for ending the impunity for war crimes that has plagued Africa and other regions. Last week one of Taylor's key henchmen, Gus Kouwenhoven, has been convicted of weapons trafficking and sentenced to eight years in prison. The prosecution is appealing, asking for more time for human rights abuses.
This may mean the traditional wall of impunity is developing chinks. It does not signal an end to the rapacious "Big Men" of Africa, but it could show that, if pushed far enough, people will demand and receive justice, even if delayed and incomplete.
The trip from Freetown, Sierra Leone, where the charges against him were lodged by the U.N.-back Special Court for Sierra Leone, marks the end of one phase of the saga that saw Taylor flee Liberia, receive asylum in Nigeria, attempt an escape and then be held under shaky security in Sierra Leone.
The Special Court will still conduct the trial, not the ICC, and that will be the next phase of Taylor's tumble from power. The ICC is simply lending its secure facilities to hold Taylor who, after all, escaped from a U.S. prison in Massachusetts before starting his murderous exploits in Africa that plunged an entire region into chaos.
A friend of Hezbollah, al Qaeda, Viktor Bout and other terrorist and criminal organizations, Taylor presided over wars and conflicts that devastated an entire region, and cost hundreds of thousands of lives. He enjoyed the friendship and complicity of Gadaffi in Libya, Compaore in Burkina Faso and several other heads of state. He befriended Pat Robertson, Jesse Jackson and others across the Christian spectrum with his ability to appear to be a simple Baptist minister.
Many in the human rights community wanted the trial to remain in Freetown to show that African countries can judge their own.
It is a nice idea. But given Taylor's signficant offshore financial empire and other holdings, and his demonstrated ability to recruit armed thugs and create chaos made the risk too high.
The corruptability of the guards, Taylor's ability to threaten the families of guards, witnesses and lawyer from prison and the proximity of loyal armed groups and complicit heads of state all made the chances of his facing justice from a Freetown prison to low to bet on.
Taylor's transfer to ICC facilities became possible when the British late last week agreed to hold him if he is convicted. The issue of where he would spend his prison time had bogged things down for several weeks, as the Dutch did not want that responsibility. When the British stepped forward, the final roadblock was removed.
Taylor's trial will be the most important of a generation for ending the impunity for war crimes that has plagued Africa and other regions. Last week one of Taylor's key henchmen, Gus Kouwenhoven, has been convicted of weapons trafficking and sentenced to eight years in prison. The prosecution is appealing, asking for more time for human rights abuses.
This may mean the traditional wall of impunity is developing chinks. It does not signal an end to the rapacious "Big Men" of Africa, but it could show that, if pushed far enough, people will demand and receive justice, even if delayed and incomplete.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Tuesday December 19, 2006
Jihadists Now Targetting Africa
A recent article in Sada al-Jihad (Echo of Jihad), an on-line magazine supporting global jihad, outlines al Qaeda's growing interest in exanding into sub-Saharan Africa. The Project for the Research of Islamic Movements (PRISM) translated some of the June 2006 article by Abu Azzam al-Ansari, titled "Al Qaeda Moving to Africa," and published in the magazine's June issue, the seventh time the magazine has appeared.
The author clearly states the advantages Africa offers global mujahadeen in their struggle. Among the primary ones named are:
1) The broad weakness of the governments and corruption, making it easier to operate in Africa than "in other countries which have effective security, intelligence and military capacities";
2) The number of people with significant combat experience that can be recruited across the continent among the many large Muslim communities;
3) The poverty and social conditions which "will enable the mujahadeen to provide some finance and welfare, thus, posting there some of their influential operatives";
4) The availability of cheap weapons in many parts of the continent;
5) The richness of Africa in oil and raw materials. (Diamonds, anyone?)
It is not at all clear from the document that the al Qaeda reference is to the old-guard al Qaeda. Rather, it seems to be something more in line with Abu Musab al-Suri and his idea of self-starting radical groups empowered to take whatever action they deem necessary and appropriate to their circumstances.
In this light, the continuing expansion of Salafist forces in Somalia, and the seemingly-complete rout of U.S.-backed warlords acquires another dimension. Rather than a product of the internal circumstances of Somalia and the years of chaos there, the Islamist triumph may be the first step in broader, though loose-knit strategy to make significant use of Africa in the near and mid-term.
It also bodes ill for the conflict in Darfur, which Osama bin Laden has already cast as part of the jihadi struggle, and other areas where the Salafists are already established (Algeria, Mali, Chad etc.)
PRISM notes that the document offers a suprisingly pragmatic view to approaching the Sufi Muslim population of the region, rather than the traditional Salafi-Jihadi rhetoric.
"The line of thought of approaching the Sufis, with their huge presence in Africa, is another sign of the pragmatic thinking of the new generation of global Jihad—dogmatism and central
command are no longer a typical position. There is also no sign of Takfiri positions. Therefore, pragmatism and the attempt to compromise with the local conditions and adopt them, increase the weight of local conflicts, local Jihadi groups, and the focus on
each conflict separately. There is no call for Jihadi unity in Africa, but for more chaos that will serve the interests of global Jihad in other, more important, regions."
The author clearly states the advantages Africa offers global mujahadeen in their struggle. Among the primary ones named are:
1) The broad weakness of the governments and corruption, making it easier to operate in Africa than "in other countries which have effective security, intelligence and military capacities";
2) The number of people with significant combat experience that can be recruited across the continent among the many large Muslim communities;
3) The poverty and social conditions which "will enable the mujahadeen to provide some finance and welfare, thus, posting there some of their influential operatives";
4) The availability of cheap weapons in many parts of the continent;
5) The richness of Africa in oil and raw materials. (Diamonds, anyone?)
It is not at all clear from the document that the al Qaeda reference is to the old-guard al Qaeda. Rather, it seems to be something more in line with Abu Musab al-Suri and his idea of self-starting radical groups empowered to take whatever action they deem necessary and appropriate to their circumstances.
In this light, the continuing expansion of Salafist forces in Somalia, and the seemingly-complete rout of U.S.-backed warlords acquires another dimension. Rather than a product of the internal circumstances of Somalia and the years of chaos there, the Islamist triumph may be the first step in broader, though loose-knit strategy to make significant use of Africa in the near and mid-term.
It also bodes ill for the conflict in Darfur, which Osama bin Laden has already cast as part of the jihadi struggle, and other areas where the Salafists are already established (Algeria, Mali, Chad etc.)
PRISM notes that the document offers a suprisingly pragmatic view to approaching the Sufi Muslim population of the region, rather than the traditional Salafi-Jihadi rhetoric.
"The line of thought of approaching the Sufis, with their huge presence in Africa, is another sign of the pragmatic thinking of the new generation of global Jihad—dogmatism and central
command are no longer a typical position. There is also no sign of Takfiri positions. Therefore, pragmatism and the attempt to compromise with the local conditions and adopt them, increase the weight of local conflicts, local Jihadi groups, and the focus on
each conflict separately. There is no call for Jihadi unity in Africa, but for more chaos that will serve the interests of global Jihad in other, more important, regions."
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Tuesday December 19, 2006
A Hardy Band in Congress Press for UAE Accountability
A small but determined bipartisian group in Congress continues to press the United Arab Emirates for accountability on several important fronts.
In a recent letter to UAE ambassador Al Asri Al Dhahri, the group asked for further information on UAE's efforts crack down on the use of diamonds and gold by terrorist and criminal groups, the operations of Viktor Bout, monitoring hawalas and other informal value transfer systems and money laundering.
The letter is signed by Reps. Sue Kelly of New York, the Republican vice chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, Florida Republican Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Massachusetts Democratic Rep. Stephen Lynch, Florida Republican Rep. Mark Foley and California Democratic Rep. Diane Watson.
The letter rightfully acknowledged the UAE's initial steps on some fronts, but pointed out the remaining dangers and that much remains to be done. It follows up on issues the administration has long lost interest in.
"We believe that weaknesses in the UAE's financial defenses tie directly to the ability of nuclear proliferators and terrorist operatives to successfully operate in the UAE," the letter said.
The letter added that "We are concerned that the UAE continues to facilitate the easy transfer of bulk cash and high-value commodity items such as gold, jewelry and gemstones. We are aware of the cultural differences which lead some in your region to not view the transport of significant amounts of these items with suspicion. However, this method of value transfer is prevalent among terrorist operatives and transnational criminals and we firmly believe more must be done to address it.
"Dubai's status as a leading international center for trade in gold and precious stones requires that the UAE government assume a leadership role in creating and enforcing a strong regulatory regime to monitor trade activity and the transport of these commodities. We feel that there is clearly room for more progress in this regard - a man leaving Dubai was recently captured in a Moscow airport with over five pounds of diamonds on his person."
On Viktor Bout, the letter noted that the UAE has reportedly taken some action to keep Bout's aircraft from operating there, but asked for further assurances that he would not be allowed to reappear using different companies. "The US exports its most advanced weaponry to the UAE on the assumption it will not go to its enemies. This assumption is undermined by the tolerance of arms traffickers such as Bout," the letter said.
In a recent letter to UAE ambassador Al Asri Al Dhahri, the group asked for further information on UAE's efforts crack down on the use of diamonds and gold by terrorist and criminal groups, the operations of Viktor Bout, monitoring hawalas and other informal value transfer systems and money laundering.
The letter is signed by Reps. Sue Kelly of New York, the Republican vice chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, Florida Republican Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Massachusetts Democratic Rep. Stephen Lynch, Florida Republican Rep. Mark Foley and California Democratic Rep. Diane Watson.
The letter rightfully acknowledged the UAE's initial steps on some fronts, but pointed out the remaining dangers and that much remains to be done. It follows up on issues the administration has long lost interest in.
"We believe that weaknesses in the UAE's financial defenses tie directly to the ability of nuclear proliferators and terrorist operatives to successfully operate in the UAE," the letter said.
The letter added that "We are concerned that the UAE continues to facilitate the easy transfer of bulk cash and high-value commodity items such as gold, jewelry and gemstones. We are aware of the cultural differences which lead some in your region to not view the transport of significant amounts of these items with suspicion. However, this method of value transfer is prevalent among terrorist operatives and transnational criminals and we firmly believe more must be done to address it.
"Dubai's status as a leading international center for trade in gold and precious stones requires that the UAE government assume a leadership role in creating and enforcing a strong regulatory regime to monitor trade activity and the transport of these commodities. We feel that there is clearly room for more progress in this regard - a man leaving Dubai was recently captured in a Moscow airport with over five pounds of diamonds on his person."
On Viktor Bout, the letter noted that the UAE has reportedly taken some action to keep Bout's aircraft from operating there, but asked for further assurances that he would not be allowed to reappear using different companies. "The US exports its most advanced weaponry to the UAE on the assumption it will not go to its enemies. This assumption is undermined by the tolerance of arms traffickers such as Bout," the letter said.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Tuesday December 19, 2006
Victory of Islamists in Somalia Show Dangers of Stateless Regions
The victory of radical Islamist militias in Somalia, with the subsequent vow of their leaders establish an Islamist state, highlights the dangers of festering stateless areas and the attractions they present for terrorists, transnational criminal organizations and other armed, non-state groups.
The victory also highlights the limits of U.S. power in those regions of the world. Despite some covert U.S. support for the secular warlords in the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism-the amount is not known-and the clear efforts of the U.S. Joint Combined Task Force-Horn of Africa to keep the situation from ending like this, the possibility again exists of an enclave that will provide al Qaeda and its affiliates with a safe haven to train, practice and seek refuge.
It is not clear what the U.S-backed alliance is or what it really represented except for several of the most violent elements of Somalian society that were not in the Islamist camps. Nor is it entirely clear what the Islamist groups represent other than a desire to install Sharia law across the land.
This is similar to the advantages enjoyed by al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, although the Taliban had a semblance of a central government, while Somalia does not.
Somalia offers virtually no economic benefits to terrorists and other non-state actors, in contrast to Liberia and the Democratic Republic of Congo. What it does offer, however, is proximity to numerous battlefronts where militant Islamists want to fight and where they have a well-developed infrastructure-Kenya (home of the 1998 Embassy bombing), Yemen (the USS Cole), and other nearby points of interest.
The current intelligence apparatus has yet to come up with an effective way of recognizing, never mind effectively combating, this type of non-state threat. There is no political appetite or capacity to put boots on the ground in every potential trouble spot. But nor is there an understanding of how these stateless regions operate, where the pressure points are and how to contain, if not stop, radical Islamist groups from providing sanctuary for themselves and others under their protection.
Nor does there appear to be a clear understanding of how and when to arm and create effective proxies in wars where there are those willing to fight for U.S. interests. We have no intelligence gathering, let alone dominance, in those regions. We simply cannot fight those wars ourselves and expect any meaningful progress.
Liberia is an example of what can happen, where al Qaeda, Hezbollah, Russian organized crime and Viktor Bout all found safe haven there, and prospered. The seeming impossibility of Shi'ite and Sunni groups doing business together is a fiction of our limited understanding, as is the fiction that Israeli and Hezbollah operatives don't go into business together (see the case of Simon Yelnik and Aziz Nassour, among many).
Somalia has no "honey pot" to draw outside entrepreneurs. But Osama bin Laden has had his operatives there before, training the militias that downed the U.S. Blackhawk in 1993. Several of the East African operatives involved in the Embassy bombing hid in Somalia and some continue to do so. A sanctuary can help not only Islamists but give the Islamists something to offer-safety-to other groups on whom they depend for certain commodities-weapons and ammunition.
In the near future we could well look back on the Islamist triumph in Somalia as the beginning of another serious Islamist threat to a much broader world.
The victory also highlights the limits of U.S. power in those regions of the world. Despite some covert U.S. support for the secular warlords in the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism-the amount is not known-and the clear efforts of the U.S. Joint Combined Task Force-Horn of Africa to keep the situation from ending like this, the possibility again exists of an enclave that will provide al Qaeda and its affiliates with a safe haven to train, practice and seek refuge.
It is not clear what the U.S-backed alliance is or what it really represented except for several of the most violent elements of Somalian society that were not in the Islamist camps. Nor is it entirely clear what the Islamist groups represent other than a desire to install Sharia law across the land.
This is similar to the advantages enjoyed by al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, although the Taliban had a semblance of a central government, while Somalia does not.
Somalia offers virtually no economic benefits to terrorists and other non-state actors, in contrast to Liberia and the Democratic Republic of Congo. What it does offer, however, is proximity to numerous battlefronts where militant Islamists want to fight and where they have a well-developed infrastructure-Kenya (home of the 1998 Embassy bombing), Yemen (the USS Cole), and other nearby points of interest.
The current intelligence apparatus has yet to come up with an effective way of recognizing, never mind effectively combating, this type of non-state threat. There is no political appetite or capacity to put boots on the ground in every potential trouble spot. But nor is there an understanding of how these stateless regions operate, where the pressure points are and how to contain, if not stop, radical Islamist groups from providing sanctuary for themselves and others under their protection.
Nor does there appear to be a clear understanding of how and when to arm and create effective proxies in wars where there are those willing to fight for U.S. interests. We have no intelligence gathering, let alone dominance, in those regions. We simply cannot fight those wars ourselves and expect any meaningful progress.
Liberia is an example of what can happen, where al Qaeda, Hezbollah, Russian organized crime and Viktor Bout all found safe haven there, and prospered. The seeming impossibility of Shi'ite and Sunni groups doing business together is a fiction of our limited understanding, as is the fiction that Israeli and Hezbollah operatives don't go into business together (see the case of Simon Yelnik and Aziz Nassour, among many).
Somalia has no "honey pot" to draw outside entrepreneurs. But Osama bin Laden has had his operatives there before, training the militias that downed the U.S. Blackhawk in 1993. Several of the East African operatives involved in the Embassy bombing hid in Somalia and some continue to do so. A sanctuary can help not only Islamists but give the Islamists something to offer-safety-to other groups on whom they depend for certain commodities-weapons and ammunition.
In the near future we could well look back on the Islamist triumph in Somalia as the beginning of another serious Islamist threat to a much broader world.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH