Tuesday December 19, 2006
Why Gaddafi is so Afraid of Charles Taylor
It is interesting to see that Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi is slamming Nigeria for turning Charles Taylor over to face justice. News reports quote Gadaffi as saying such a move sets a dangerous precedent for the rest of Africa.
"This also means that every (African) head of state could meet a similar fate -- this sets a serious precedent," he said. Indeed it does. If one butcher goes down, others may follow. For Gaddafi, that must be a terrifying prospect, as well as for many others.
Gadaffi, more than any other leader except perhaps Blaise Campoare in Burkina Faso, has good reason to fear Taylor's testimony. It was Gaddafi who trained not only Taylor and his thugs for Liberia, but also Foday Sankoh and other leaders of the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone, Laurent Kabila in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Campaore's troops who assassinated president Thomas Sankara in Burkina Faso, and on and on.
But it was not just the training Gaddafi provided. He provided the tons of weapons and ammuniton that stoked the wars that claimed hundreds of thousands of lives and destroyed most of an entire sub-region that is still reeling from his ego-driven destruction.
He established the World Revolutionary Headquarters in the desert where he trained would-be revolutionaries from Latin America, Africa and Asia. The facilities were, in the words of Prof. Stephen Ellis, "the Harvard and Yale of a whole generation of African revolutionaries."
Gaddafi continued his support of Taylor, to the tune of tens of millions of dollars, when Taylor's forces were at their most vicious. Taylor would fly to meet with Gaddafi or other senior Libyan leaders two or three times a month, right through the war and his own 1997 election as president.
One of the great shortcomings of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, in my opinion, was that Gaddafi was not indicted along with Taylor on charges of crimes against humanity. They would have been fine cellmates. The Court argued that its mandate was to try those most responsible for atrocities after Taylor's 1997 election, and that, by then, Gaddafi no longer fit the criteria.
Washington's decision to take Gaddafi off the list of terrorist sponsors is also hard to understand given his continuing mischief in Africa, from Zimbabwe to Equatorial Guinea.
Perhaps these are legally correct interpretations of the law, but it seems to me both let Gaddafi off too lightly for his role in massive crimes against humanity. It is nice, however, to see him scared enough to defend the indefensible.
"This also means that every (African) head of state could meet a similar fate -- this sets a serious precedent," he said. Indeed it does. If one butcher goes down, others may follow. For Gaddafi, that must be a terrifying prospect, as well as for many others.
Gadaffi, more than any other leader except perhaps Blaise Campoare in Burkina Faso, has good reason to fear Taylor's testimony. It was Gaddafi who trained not only Taylor and his thugs for Liberia, but also Foday Sankoh and other leaders of the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone, Laurent Kabila in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Campaore's troops who assassinated president Thomas Sankara in Burkina Faso, and on and on.
But it was not just the training Gaddafi provided. He provided the tons of weapons and ammuniton that stoked the wars that claimed hundreds of thousands of lives and destroyed most of an entire sub-region that is still reeling from his ego-driven destruction.
He established the World Revolutionary Headquarters in the desert where he trained would-be revolutionaries from Latin America, Africa and Asia. The facilities were, in the words of Prof. Stephen Ellis, "the Harvard and Yale of a whole generation of African revolutionaries."
Gaddafi continued his support of Taylor, to the tune of tens of millions of dollars, when Taylor's forces were at their most vicious. Taylor would fly to meet with Gaddafi or other senior Libyan leaders two or three times a month, right through the war and his own 1997 election as president.
One of the great shortcomings of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, in my opinion, was that Gaddafi was not indicted along with Taylor on charges of crimes against humanity. They would have been fine cellmates. The Court argued that its mandate was to try those most responsible for atrocities after Taylor's 1997 election, and that, by then, Gaddafi no longer fit the criteria.
Washington's decision to take Gaddafi off the list of terrorist sponsors is also hard to understand given his continuing mischief in Africa, from Zimbabwe to Equatorial Guinea.
Perhaps these are legally correct interpretations of the law, but it seems to me both let Gaddafi off too lightly for his role in massive crimes against humanity. It is nice, however, to see him scared enough to defend the indefensible.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Tuesday December 19, 2006
Winning a Minimum of Public Support Vital in Iraq, Afghanistan
During the Central American wars, perhaps because of the nearness to the Vietnam experience, there as a broad understanding that, to neutralize a highly-motivated enemy it was vital to have the population in the enemy's theater of operation at worst neutral and at best cooperative.
Civilian populations caught in conflict zones often make their calculations of who to support based on who they think can inflict the most pain if they do not cooperate. This is true up to a point, but when repression becomes unbearable, civilians will also join the side they believe will help eliminate the oppressor.
This lesson seems to be lost in much of what is going on in Iraq, looking at Anbar province, and Afghanistan, with the rioting in Kabul. The Washington Post has an interesting article quoting the Sunni leaders of Anbar province on their reality:
"We hope to get rid of al-Qaeda, which is a huge burden on the city. Unfortunately, Zarqawi's fist is stronger than the Americans'," said one Sunni sheik, who spoke on condition of anonymity for fear of insurgent retaliation. He was referring to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, an umbrella group for many of the foreign and local resistance fighters in Iraq. Local Sunni leaders often insist that the most violent insurgent attacks are by foreign fighters, not Iraqi Sunnis.
In Ramadi, "Zarqawi is the one who is in control," the sheik said, speaking to a Washington Post special correspondent in Ramadi. "He kills anyone who goes in and out of the U.S. base. We have stopped meetings with the Americans, because, frankly speaking, we have lost confidence in the U.S. side, as they can't protect us."
The balance of power tipped toward U.S.-backed forces in El Salvador when people who were caught in the middle felt the military would be there to protect them, and, at the same time, would not abuse them. As human rights improved and the army became more disciplined, people returned to their homes, even under army control, because they were able to.
This was a key element in keeping the FMLN from successfully broadening their areas of control after the mid-1980s. I spent countless nights with peasants on both sides of the conflict who were trying to figure out how to survive, and their loyalty was to anyone who could provide them safety. Of course there are committed cadres on both sides, as there are here. But they cannot survive without the broad ability to at least count on the neutrality of the bulk of the population.
If people perceive their options as supporting Zarqawi or being killed, they will support Zarqawi for survival. Such support is not deep, but it can be broad. The only way to confront it is to offer civilians security first. With security will come more cooperation, especially if the enemy is a brutal as Zarqawi has shown himself to be.
But if the areas are not secured to the degree that people feel they can talk to someone without it being 1) reporeted and 2) avenged, then you face a hostile, scared population that will give you nothing but blank stares, bad information and intense hatred for disrupting their chances of survival.
Civilian populations caught in conflict zones often make their calculations of who to support based on who they think can inflict the most pain if they do not cooperate. This is true up to a point, but when repression becomes unbearable, civilians will also join the side they believe will help eliminate the oppressor.
This lesson seems to be lost in much of what is going on in Iraq, looking at Anbar province, and Afghanistan, with the rioting in Kabul. The Washington Post has an interesting article quoting the Sunni leaders of Anbar province on their reality:
"We hope to get rid of al-Qaeda, which is a huge burden on the city. Unfortunately, Zarqawi's fist is stronger than the Americans'," said one Sunni sheik, who spoke on condition of anonymity for fear of insurgent retaliation. He was referring to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, an umbrella group for many of the foreign and local resistance fighters in Iraq. Local Sunni leaders often insist that the most violent insurgent attacks are by foreign fighters, not Iraqi Sunnis.
In Ramadi, "Zarqawi is the one who is in control," the sheik said, speaking to a Washington Post special correspondent in Ramadi. "He kills anyone who goes in and out of the U.S. base. We have stopped meetings with the Americans, because, frankly speaking, we have lost confidence in the U.S. side, as they can't protect us."
The balance of power tipped toward U.S.-backed forces in El Salvador when people who were caught in the middle felt the military would be there to protect them, and, at the same time, would not abuse them. As human rights improved and the army became more disciplined, people returned to their homes, even under army control, because they were able to.
This was a key element in keeping the FMLN from successfully broadening their areas of control after the mid-1980s. I spent countless nights with peasants on both sides of the conflict who were trying to figure out how to survive, and their loyalty was to anyone who could provide them safety. Of course there are committed cadres on both sides, as there are here. But they cannot survive without the broad ability to at least count on the neutrality of the bulk of the population.
If people perceive their options as supporting Zarqawi or being killed, they will support Zarqawi for survival. Such support is not deep, but it can be broad. The only way to confront it is to offer civilians security first. With security will come more cooperation, especially if the enemy is a brutal as Zarqawi has shown himself to be.
But if the areas are not secured to the degree that people feel they can talk to someone without it being 1) reporeted and 2) avenged, then you face a hostile, scared population that will give you nothing but blank stares, bad information and intense hatred for disrupting their chances of survival.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Wednesday May 24, 2006
The Emerging Shape of Future Jihad
The coming shape of the Islamist jihad war is becoming clear: self-starting groups that are increasingly decentralized structure, linked by shifting networks and communicating almost exclusively through the Internet.
The chief architect of this strategy is the Spanish-Syrian strategist Mustafa Setmariam Nasar, the subject of a very nice piece in The Washington Post, whose 1,600 page treastise, "The Call for a Global Islamic Resistance," has been circulating on Web sites for 18 months.
Written under the pen name Abu Musab al-Suri, the document espouses the concept of "nizam, la tanzim," or ‘System, not organisation.’ Jihadist groups should develop a template that allows them to create structures wherever they are, and carry out recruitment, fund-raising and attacks.
The leadership, as traditionally understood in hierarchical structures, would be limited solely to general guidence of the true believers. This would essentially do away with the role of the traditional al Qaeda leadership in directing attacks or plotting a grand military strategy.
One of the most interesting things about Nasar, now in prison after being arrested in Pakistan last October, is his willingness to extensively engage in self-criticism and critique of al Qaeda and its operations. He has even been willing to differ publicly with Osama bin Laden, at least during bin Laden's days in the late 1990s as an occassional media star.
This strategy is not necessarily widely embraced by the traditional jihadist leadership, and certainly not by the traditional Muslim Brotherhood groups, who maintain a fairly rigid structure and closed network.
Yet the two strategies are also not mutually exclusive. There can be a hierachical organization at the core that plans for the larger actions of the al Qaeda structure, as structures are needed to acquire and train with weapons of mass destruction or biological and chemical attacks.
At the same time, Nasar's strategy offers an opening to anyone, anywhere, to fulfill his Islamist duty to attack the infidel. This type of attack is cheap, hard to detect, relatively easy to organize and, if compromised, hurts only a few people. It is also much harder to prevent or obtain good intelligence on.
The one ray of hope is that few Muslims have embraced Nasar's strategy so far, at least to the point of acting on it. There may be even fewer Muslims in Europe and elsewhere who believe his hateful message and are willing to act on it than he thought. Or maybe there are things in progress that will prove he has an audience.
The chief architect of this strategy is the Spanish-Syrian strategist Mustafa Setmariam Nasar, the subject of a very nice piece in The Washington Post, whose 1,600 page treastise, "The Call for a Global Islamic Resistance," has been circulating on Web sites for 18 months.
Written under the pen name Abu Musab al-Suri, the document espouses the concept of "nizam, la tanzim," or ‘System, not organisation.’ Jihadist groups should develop a template that allows them to create structures wherever they are, and carry out recruitment, fund-raising and attacks.
The leadership, as traditionally understood in hierarchical structures, would be limited solely to general guidence of the true believers. This would essentially do away with the role of the traditional al Qaeda leadership in directing attacks or plotting a grand military strategy.
One of the most interesting things about Nasar, now in prison after being arrested in Pakistan last October, is his willingness to extensively engage in self-criticism and critique of al Qaeda and its operations. He has even been willing to differ publicly with Osama bin Laden, at least during bin Laden's days in the late 1990s as an occassional media star.
This strategy is not necessarily widely embraced by the traditional jihadist leadership, and certainly not by the traditional Muslim Brotherhood groups, who maintain a fairly rigid structure and closed network.
Yet the two strategies are also not mutually exclusive. There can be a hierachical organization at the core that plans for the larger actions of the al Qaeda structure, as structures are needed to acquire and train with weapons of mass destruction or biological and chemical attacks.
At the same time, Nasar's strategy offers an opening to anyone, anywhere, to fulfill his Islamist duty to attack the infidel. This type of attack is cheap, hard to detect, relatively easy to organize and, if compromised, hurts only a few people. It is also much harder to prevent or obtain good intelligence on.
The one ray of hope is that few Muslims have embraced Nasar's strategy so far, at least to the point of acting on it. There may be even fewer Muslims in Europe and elsewhere who believe his hateful message and are willing to act on it than he thought. Or maybe there are things in progress that will prove he has an audience.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Monday December 18, 2006
Finally, Some Fact Checking on Bogus Saudi Claims
The Washington Post Outlook Section finally called the Saudi Royals, and current U.S. ambassador, Prince Turki al-Faisal, on the lies of their intolerance. It is about time someone did in a consistant manner. The myth the Saudi royals perpetrate about removing hate speech against everyone who does not believe as they do is important to the narrative of its own progress the kingdom hopes to develop.
The problem is, it is simply not true, as the piece documents. Ambassador Turki and others want to believe that repeating a lie often enough makes it true. That is what they are paid to do, and they pay millions to get others to repeat the lies.
It seems that is the plan with the repetition of many things related to the kingdom that are not true, and yet are repeated day after day, month after month: the Financial Investigative Unit is functioning; designated individuals are being punished; efforts to curb terror finance are proceeding.
In fact, none of these are true. The FIU has done no work at all since it was reportedly formed more than a year ago. Designated individuals like Wa'el Julaidan are not even under house arrest. In fact, the Royals are willing to spend time and political capital to get some of their most important people off the U.N. list of individuals banned for supporting terrorism.
It is stunning the Bush administration, for all its talk of democracy and transparency, is not only unwilling to pursue these issues with the Royals. No one is willing to debunk the lie by looking at reality.
The textbooks put out in Saudi Arabia still refer to Jews as monkeys and pigs, advocate violent jihad, forbid even friendship with non-believers (difficult to reconcile with the family friendships many of the Royals have with leaders here), and endorse the Protocols of Zion.
The administration tries to block any meaningful investigations into what the Saudis really do and even appear to have a hand in keeping member of Congress, even Republicans (See Rep. Sue Kelly), from having a chance to investigate issues first hand.
Every once in a while the truth bubbles to the surface. It is vitally important to keep the myth from taking root and shaping the debate over radical Islamist goals and teachings.
The problem is, it is simply not true, as the piece documents. Ambassador Turki and others want to believe that repeating a lie often enough makes it true. That is what they are paid to do, and they pay millions to get others to repeat the lies.
It seems that is the plan with the repetition of many things related to the kingdom that are not true, and yet are repeated day after day, month after month: the Financial Investigative Unit is functioning; designated individuals are being punished; efforts to curb terror finance are proceeding.
In fact, none of these are true. The FIU has done no work at all since it was reportedly formed more than a year ago. Designated individuals like Wa'el Julaidan are not even under house arrest. In fact, the Royals are willing to spend time and political capital to get some of their most important people off the U.N. list of individuals banned for supporting terrorism.
It is stunning the Bush administration, for all its talk of democracy and transparency, is not only unwilling to pursue these issues with the Royals. No one is willing to debunk the lie by looking at reality.
The textbooks put out in Saudi Arabia still refer to Jews as monkeys and pigs, advocate violent jihad, forbid even friendship with non-believers (difficult to reconcile with the family friendships many of the Royals have with leaders here), and endorse the Protocols of Zion.
The administration tries to block any meaningful investigations into what the Saudis really do and even appear to have a hand in keeping member of Congress, even Republicans (See Rep. Sue Kelly), from having a chance to investigate issues first hand.
Every once in a while the truth bubbles to the surface. It is vitally important to keep the myth from taking root and shaping the debate over radical Islamist goals and teachings.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH
Tuesday December 19, 2006
Iran Willing to Step into the Breach for Palestinian Authority
My European contacts say Iran's Shi'ite regime is gearing up to rescue the Hamas-led, bankrupt Palestinian Authority with significant amounts of cash.
This move would serve two purposes: deeply embarrass and humiliate the Sunni-led regimes in the Gulf, who so far have failed to come up with a way to help Hamas despite repeated vows to do so; expand Iran's influence at a time when the threat of isolation from the West is growing. Swelling oil revenues have given the Iranian regime the revue they need to be able to pull this off.
While Saudi Arabia, Qatar and other government struggle to overcome the banking obstacles they would face in funding Hamas, the Iranan leaders appear willing to take significant risks to win the race and claim the mantle of protectors and defenders of the Palestinians. It would also expand Iranian influence in a region where it already controls Hezbollah, giving it two military factions that could be called on internationally should there be military action against Iran. Both have a strong presence in the United States and Latin America as well, should retaliatory strikes be Iran be deemed necessary.
The consequences of Iranian funding of Hamas could also be more widespread. It was the success of the 1979 Iranian revolution that spurred the Saudi Salafists to pour billions of dollars into the global expansion of fundamentalist Sunni Islam. The Iranian revolution had the radicalizing effect of unleashing the salafist resources across much of the world, and it could further hinder the already-feeble steps toward reform and cutting off of terror finance the Saudi royals claim to be enacting.
The PLO of Arafat provided protection to Ayatollah Khommeni when he flew in from exile to assume his place at the head of the Iranian revolution in Tehran. The Ayatollah and his entourage were in the first plane, with the PLO security on the second. The third plane was filled with members of the international Muslim Brotherhood led by Ghalib Himmat. The Brotherhood's relationship with the Ayatollah soon soured, but it showed the clout the group had, cutting across the Sunni-Shi'ite divide. It will be interesting to see what role the Brothers will now play in this latest bit of geopolitical theater.
This move would serve two purposes: deeply embarrass and humiliate the Sunni-led regimes in the Gulf, who so far have failed to come up with a way to help Hamas despite repeated vows to do so; expand Iran's influence at a time when the threat of isolation from the West is growing. Swelling oil revenues have given the Iranian regime the revue they need to be able to pull this off.
While Saudi Arabia, Qatar and other government struggle to overcome the banking obstacles they would face in funding Hamas, the Iranan leaders appear willing to take significant risks to win the race and claim the mantle of protectors and defenders of the Palestinians. It would also expand Iranian influence in a region where it already controls Hezbollah, giving it two military factions that could be called on internationally should there be military action against Iran. Both have a strong presence in the United States and Latin America as well, should retaliatory strikes be Iran be deemed necessary.
The consequences of Iranian funding of Hamas could also be more widespread. It was the success of the 1979 Iranian revolution that spurred the Saudi Salafists to pour billions of dollars into the global expansion of fundamentalist Sunni Islam. The Iranian revolution had the radicalizing effect of unleashing the salafist resources across much of the world, and it could further hinder the already-feeble steps toward reform and cutting off of terror finance the Saudi royals claim to be enacting.
The PLO of Arafat provided protection to Ayatollah Khommeni when he flew in from exile to assume his place at the head of the Iranian revolution in Tehran. The Ayatollah and his entourage were in the first plane, with the PLO security on the second. The third plane was filled with members of the international Muslim Brotherhood led by Ghalib Himmat. The Brotherhood's relationship with the Ayatollah soon soured, but it showed the clout the group had, cutting across the Sunni-Shi'ite divide. It will be interesting to see what role the Brothers will now play in this latest bit of geopolitical theater.
POSTED BY DOUGLAS FARAH